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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we develop a novel theory of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Firms can
choose between different modes of foreign market access: exporting, greenfield FDI, and cross-
border M&A. Our theory is based on three key ideas. First, there is heterogeneity in firms'
capabilities. Second, these capabilities differ in their degree of international mobility. Third,
capabilities are traded in a merger market. We address two questions: (1) what are the characteristics
of firms that choose the various modes of foreign market access, and (2) how does the composition
of international commerce vary across industries and countries? 
We show that the degree to which firms differ in their mobile and non-mobile capabilities
plays a crucial role for the composition of international commerce: depending on whether firms
differ in their mobile or immobile capabilities, cross-border mergers may involve the most or the
least efficient active firms. A similar dichotomy obtains when analyzing the effects of country and
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In an increasingly globalized world, the decision of how best to serve foreign markets is becoming
one of the key challenges facing ﬁrms. A ﬁrm that has decided to sell its product abroad has
two distinct options of serving foreign markets: exporting or producing locally (foreign direct
investment (FDI)). If the ﬁrm decides to produce locally, it can choose between building its own
establishment (greenﬁeld investment) or to acquire an existing ﬁrm (cross-border merger and
acquisition (M&A)). The fundamental diﬀerence between cross-border M&A and greenﬁeld FDI
is that cross-border M&A involves a transaction between a buyer and a seller at an endogenous
price, while greenﬁeld FDI is simply an investment decision that does not involve a market
transaction and is therefore not directly constrained by market clearing conditions for ﬁrm
assets.
While the diﬀerence between cross-border M&A and greenﬁeld investment might seem sub-
tle at ﬁrst glance, there is a belief among the agents who conduct or inﬂuence international
commerce that these modes are in fact very diﬀerent. First, a vast business literature suggests
that ﬁrms view cross-border M&A and greenﬁeld investment as very diﬀerent modes of FDI so
that the choice between these modes requires careful cost/beneﬁt analysis. Second, as inter-
national commerce has increasingly taken the form of foreign direct investment, governments
have sought to design policies vis-à-vis foreign ﬁrms entering their market. In formulating
their approach to the treatment of foreign ﬁrms producing in their market, many governments
perceive the costs and beneﬁts of the two modes of FDI as very diﬀerent.
In a number of host countries, concern is expressed in political discussions and the
media that FDI entry through the takeover of domestic ﬁr m si sl e s sb e n e ﬁcial, if
not positively harmful, for economic development than entry by setting up new
facilities. At the heart of these concerns is that foreign acquisitions do not add
to productive capacity but simply transfer ownership and control from domestic
to foreign hands. (United Nations Center for Transnational Corporations, 2000, p.
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Figure 1: Acquisitions in total manufacturing FDI.
Interestingly, while the CEOs of multinational ﬁrms and government policymakers believe
that greenﬁeld investment and cross-border M&A are distinct modes of FDI, the academic
literature in International Trade has not distinguished between the two modes. In fact, almost
all of the literature has implicitly assumed that FDI takes the form of greenﬁeld. Yet, empirical
evidence shows that ﬁrms engaging in FDI have entered foreign markets mainly by purchasing
existing foreign ﬁrms rather than by building new plants. As ﬁgure 1 illustrates, in every year
from 1981 to 2001, between 75% and 90% of all new foreign aﬃliates in U.S. manufacturing
have been acquired by foreign ﬁrms (cross-border M&A), while only 10% -25% have been newly
established (greenﬁeld investment).
Given the empirical importance of cross-border M&A, it is worth asking ﬁrst why mergers
occur more generally. According to the business literature, ﬁrms diﬀer in their underlying
capabilities, and many mergers occur to allow ﬁrms to exploit complementarities in these
capabilities. In the international context, cross-border mergers often occur because local ﬁrms
have some capabilities, such as the knowledge of local market conditions that foreign ﬁrms lack,
while foreign ﬁrms bring some other capabilities, such as organizational capital or technologyNocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 3
to the party. That is, cross-border mergers are frequently motivated by the complementarities
between internationally mobile and non-mobile capabilities. Caves (1996, p. 70) summarizes
this motive as follows:
The going concern is a working coalition. From the viewpoint of the foreign MNE,
it possesses an operating local management familiar with the national market envi-
ronment. The MNE that buys the local ﬁrm also buys access to a stock of valuable
information.
A cross-border acquisition thus allows a ﬁrm to get costly access to the country-speciﬁc
capabilities of the acquired ﬁrm, and the price of such an acquisition is governed by demand
and supply. In contrast, by engaging in greenﬁeld FDI, a ﬁrm brings only its own capabilities
to work abroad. Diﬀerent ﬁrms will solve this trade-oﬀ diﬀerently.
One contribution of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework of international com-
merce in which ﬁrms can choose between diﬀerent modes of foreign market access (exporting
vs. greenﬁeld FDI vs. cross-border M&A). Our framework formalizes the three key ideas devel-
oped above. First, there is heterogeneity in ﬁrms’ capabilities. Second, these capabilities diﬀer
in their degree of international mobility. Third, capabilities are traded in a merger market, and
so the price of capabilities is determined by (endogenous) supply and demand. We then use
this framework to address two questions: (1) what are the characteristics of ﬁrms that choose
these various modes of foreign market access, and (2) how does the composition of international
commerce vary across industries and countries?
The three key ideas on which our framework builds have important consequences for our
understanding of international commerce.
First, because we distinguish between mobile and non-mobile capabilities we are able to
identify a unique motive for ﬁrms to engage in FDI: to obtain non-mobile capabilities in other
countries. We ﬁnd that as capabilities become relatively less mobile internationally that cross-
border M&A becomes the favored mode of entry into foreign markets. Given the relative
importance of cross-border M&A in total FDI, our framework suggests that a key motive for
FDI is to obtain non-mobile capabilities. To our knowledge, the empirical Trade literatureNocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 4
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Figure 2: The composition of international commerce by industry type.
ignores the role of non-mobile capabilities in the trade-oﬀ between exports and FDI.
Second, we show that the source of ﬁrm heterogeneity is a critical determinant of the
composition of international commerce. While ﬁrms have long been known to diﬀer within
industries in terms of their observed eﬃciency, the underlying source of this heterogeneity
is likely to diﬀer across industries. In industries where ﬁrms diﬀer mainly in their mobile
capabilities, the most eﬃcient ﬁrms will engage in cross-border M&A, while in industries where
ﬁrms diﬀer mainly in their country-speciﬁc non-mobile capabilities, cross-border M&A will
involve the least eﬃcient active ﬁrms. The composition of international commerce for the two
types of industries is illustrated in ﬁgure 2.
This dichotomy has wide-ranging implications for empirical work. A small but fast growing
empirical literature seeks to understand the relationship between a ﬁrm’s characteristics and its
choice of mode of serving foreign markets. By and large, researchers impose a single mapping
from ﬁrm characteristics to mode choice across industries and obtain mixed results. Our theory
suggests the common procedure of pooling industries in regression analyses is inappropriate as
the mapping from ﬁrm characteristics to mode choices diﬀers qualitatively across industries inNocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 5
a systematic fashion.
Third, we show that the presence of a merger market clearing condition for country-speciﬁc
capabilities has wide ranging implication for the eﬀect of other country and industry char-
acteristics on the distribution of eﬃciencies within an industry. In our model, foreign ﬁrms
demand local non-mobile capabilities which are in turn supplied by local ﬁrms. Mergers thus
have a direct eﬀect on the nature of ﬁrms producing in a country and so inﬂuence aggregate
industry eﬃciency. To the extent that changes in country and industry characteristics alter
the supply and demand for local non-mobile capabilities, the eﬀect of changes in these charac-
teristics is mediated by the merger market. In models without cross-border M&A, the eﬀect of
country and industry variables on aggregate industry eﬃciency can be dramatically diﬀerent.
Our results are thus of interest to a growing empirical research into the eﬀect of international
commerce on aggregate industry eﬃciency.
Related Literature. Our paper contributes to a growing literature that analyzes the en-
dogenous selection of heterogeneous ﬁrms into modes of foreign market entry.1 Within this
literature, the paper that is closest in spirit to ours is Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004)
who consider only two modes of foreign market entry: exports and greenﬁeld FDI. The key
diﬀerences between our paper and that of Helpman et al. (HMY) is that (i) we introduce the
idea that not all types of capabilities are perfectly mobile internationally, and (ii) in our model,
ﬁrms can trade capabilities in a merger market. By considering both mobile and non-mobile
capabilities, our framework (1) gives rise to cross-border M&A, and (2) yields diﬀerent predic-
tions on the composition of international commerce. In HMY, ﬁrms that engage in FDI are
the most eﬃcient ﬁrms within an industry. In contrast, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms conducting FDI via
cross-border M&A are the least eﬃcient active ﬁrms when the source of ﬁrm heterogeneity is
due to non-mobile capabilities. We also ﬁnd that the merger market clearing condition, not
present in HMY, has important implications for the eﬀect of country and industry character-
istics on the distribution of ﬁrm eﬃciencies. For example, in HMY, the mapping from a ﬁrm’s
eﬃciency to its mode of foreign market access is independent of the size of a country, while in
1A key paper in this literature is Melitz (2003) who analyzes the decision of ﬁrms to enter foreign markets
by becoming exporters. Other important papers include Bernard et al. (2003) and Antras and Helpman (2003).Nocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 6
our setting, size must matter for the merger market to clear.
Our paper also contributes to the industrial organization literature on endogenous horizon-
tal mergers. In contrast to our paper, this literature has mainly been concerned with market
power as the driving force of mergers, and with the limits of monopolization through acqui-
sition (e.g., Kamien and Zang (1990), Nocke (2000)). One notable exception is the paper by
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), where acquisitions are modeled as the outcome of a stochastic
productivity process in which ﬁrms receiving bad technology shocks sell their capacity to more
eﬃcient ﬁrms. The literature on cross-border M&A is still in its infancy, and authors in this
literature have also focused on market power as the motivation for mergers (e.g., Head and
Ries (1997), Horn and Persson (2001), Neary (2003)).2
Outline. The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we describe in detail
our theoretical framework. Then, in section 3, we turn to the equilibrium analysis. We derive
the composition of international commerce and show how it depends on the source of ﬁrm
heterogeneity. In section 4, we investigate the eﬀects of country and industry characteristics
on the composition of international commerce and the distribution of ﬁrm eﬃciencies. We
conclude in section 5.
2T h e M o d e l
We consider a model of international trade with two countries, 1 and 2, indexed by k (and
sometimes l). The aggregate income level in country k is denoted by Y k. We assume that the
two countries are of similar size so that |Y 1 − Y 2| is small. The countries are identical in all
other respects. In particular, the price of labor is the same in both countries, and normalized
to 1. The assumption of equal wages follows from the existence of an outside good that is
produced by both countries and requires only labor.
Preferences. The representative consumer has two-tier preferences: Cobb-Douglas prefer-
ences over the homogeneous outside good and two types of diﬀerentiated goods, M and N,
2An important early contribution on exogenous cross-border mergers is Markusen (1984). He analyzes the
exogenous merger of two competing national ﬁrms and the resulting welfare eﬀects.Nocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 7
and CES preferences over varieties of each diﬀerentiated good. She spends a fraction βi of her
income on the diﬀerentiated goods industry i ∈ {M,N}. Her sub-utility over the varieties of













,σ i > 1, (1)
where xk(ω) and qk(ω) are the level of consumption and the perceived quality of variety ω,
respectively, and σi the elasticity of substitution across varieties.
Firms. Each ﬁrm produces one unique variety at constant marginal costs of production.
Firms diﬀer in their capabilities. There are two types of capabilities: mobile and non-mobile.
The eﬃciency of a ﬁrm’s production technology is assumed tob em o b i l ei n t e r n a t i o n a l l y .T h e r e







h mi if e mi > 0,
∞ otherwise.
In contrast to technology, marketing expertise is assumed not to travel well. Firm’s diﬀer in
the quality of their marketing expertise, and the better the marketing expertise, the higher
is the perceived quality of the good. To emphasize the observation that marketing expertise
is not perfectly mobile internationally, we refer to a ﬁrm’s marketing expertise as the ﬁrm’s
non-mobile capability nk
i .T h eﬁrm’s perceived quality in country k is given by
qk(ω)=m a x {nk
i (ω),δinl
i(ω)} for l 6= k,
where δi ∈ (0,1). The idea here is that nk
i is a measure of quality of the ﬁrm’s marketing team
(or distribution network, sales force etc.) in country k. Ceteris paribus, a marketing team is
better in its home country than abroad: this is captured by the degree of mobility δi. Indeed,
there is recent empirical evidence suggesting that domestic ﬁrms have an advantage over foreign
ﬁrms in marketing activities in their own country; see Maurin, Thesmar, and Thoenig (2002).3
3We have chosen a particular route in modeling non-mobile capabilities. In a previous version of this paper, we
took a diﬀerent route in assuming that there are two stages of production, (i) the production of an intermediate
input and (ii) assembly. Only (i) was assumed to require scarce capabilities. In contrast to the current set-up,Nocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 8
Both mobile and non-mobile capabilities are industry-speciﬁca n dc a no n l yb eu s e db y
one ﬁrm at any time. Production and marketing have to be undertaken within the ﬁrm. A
ﬁrm owning a collection of capabilities, can use no more than one capability of each type
(non-mobile capability for each country, and mobile capability). Therefore, a ﬁrm can be
deﬁned by its ownership of its best mobile and non-mobile capabilities, {n1
i,n 2
i, e mi},a n db yi t s
home country. For convenience, we call a ﬁrm’s home country the country in which the ﬁrm’s
capability e mi was originally (i.e., upon entry) created.
If ﬁrms ship the ﬁnal output from one country to another, iceberg-type transportation
costs have to be incurred: for one unit to arrive in the foreign country, τi > 1 units need to
be shipped. The existence of these transportation costs (or tariﬀs) makes the cost of serving a
market sensitive to the location of production. If the good is produced in country k and then
shipped to country l 6= k, the marginal cost of serving country l is τic(e mi).
In addition to the variable costs, ﬁxed (corporate management) costs have be incurred
by multinational ﬁrms. First, there is a ﬁxed coordination cost Fc,i that has to be incurred
whenever the marketing team and the production of the good are in diﬀerent locations. This
coordination cost need not be incurred if (i) production takes place only in country k and the
ﬁrm uses a country-k marketing team, and (ii) production takes place in both countries and
the ﬁrm uses a marketing team in each country. Second, there is a ﬁxed cost Ff,i of managing
af o r e i g nm a r k e t i n gt e a m .
For notational convenience, we will henceforth work with the following transforms of e mi
and τi:
mi ≡ e m
σi−1
i and Ti ≡ τ
−(σi−1)
i .
The beneﬁt of these transformations is that a ﬁrm’s proﬁt is linear in the redeﬁned variables.
Note that Ti < 1 is inversely related to τi,w h i l emi is positively related to e mi.
Entry. There is a continuum of (atomless) potential entrants, each of which is endowed
with the know how to produce a unique variety. Entrants can only enter the market in their
own country. If they decide to do so, they have to pay an (irrecoverable) entry fee Fe,i. After
however, non-mobile capabilities were completely country-speciﬁc. Consequently, greenﬁeld FDI was restricted
to assembly abroad. However, almost all of the results of the two set-ups are identical.Nocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 9
a ﬁrm has paid the entry cost, it gets a random draw of its (local) non-mobile (marketing)
capability (nk
i ≥ 0 for an entrant in country k), and of its mobile capability (mi ≥ 0). A new
entrant in country k is assumed to have no marketing expertise speciﬁc to the other country,
i.e., nl
i =0for l 6= k. This captures in a tractable manner the idea that ﬁrms have an advantage
in acquiring capabilities speciﬁct ot h e i ro w nh o m ec o u n t r y .
We assume that capabilities of an entrant in country k, nk
i and mi, are independently
distributed. Industries are likely to diﬀer in the underlying source of heterogeneity between
ﬁrms. To isolate the implications of heterogeneity in the diﬀerent types of capabilities, we
assume that in industry M the underlying source of heterogeneity is in ﬁrms’ mobile capabilities,
while in industry N it is in ﬁrms’ non-mobile capabilities. In both industries, the “good” mobile
and non-mobile capabilities are scarce.
Industry M There is heterogeneity in ﬁrms’ mobile capabilities (mM), while the distribution
of ﬁrms’ non-mobile capabilities (nk







1 with probability µ,
0 with probability 1 − µ,
mM ∼ H(·) continuous with support [0,∞).
Industry N There is heterogeneity in ﬁrms’ non-mobile capabilities (nk
N), while the distrib-






1 with probability ν,
0 with probability 1 − ν,
nk
N ∼ G(·) continuous with support [0,∞).
Each ﬁrm can produce only one variety due, for instance, to entrepreneurs’ limited span
of control (Lucas (1978)). Moreover, any capability can productively be used only by a single
ﬁrm.Nocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 10
Merger Market. After ﬁrms have entered the market, their endowment of capabilities can
be traded in a perfectly competitive merger market. The equilibrium value (or proﬁt) of a ﬁrm
in home market k with capabilities {n1
i,n 2










i (n) is the market price for capability ni in country k and industry i,a n dWk
i (mi) the
market price of capability mi in country k and industry i.W h i l e a ﬁrm is identiﬁed by the
ownership of its capabilities (and its home country), we do not need to identify the “owner”
of the ﬁrm who is buying or selling capabilities on the merger market. However, it may be
convenient for the reader to identify a ﬁrm’s ownership with its mobile capability mi (and so
only the non-mobile capabilities are traded on the merger market, while Wk
i (mi) is the shadow
value of mi).
Firms and the Post-Merger Location of Production. As we will show in the next section, all
ﬁrms will locate the production in their home country. Firms will therefore serve their home
market entirely from local production. If ﬁrms only locate production in their home country,
they export their good to the foreign market, incurring iceberg-type transport costs. If ﬁrms
choose to serve the foreign market by locating production abroad (FDI), they may choose
between greenﬁeld FDI and cross-border M&A. The distinction between these two modes of
FDI is that a ﬁrm engaging in the former does not acquire a non-mobile capability speciﬁct o
the foreign country.
Product Market Competition. Since there is a continuum of atomless ﬁrms (each facing a
downward-sloping demand curve), we may think of ﬁrms as either setting prices or quantities.
We allow ﬁrms to discriminate between markets, so that they can set diﬀerent prices (or
quantities) for the two countries.
Timing. The timing of the model may be summarized as follows.
Entry Stage In each country, potential entrants decide whether or not to enter the market.
Merger Stage Firms participate in the merger market (as buyers or sellers), and decide where
to locate production (incurring the associated ﬁxed costs).Nocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 11
Output stage Firms compete in prices (or quantities) and receive proﬁts.
Equilibrium. Formally, the model may be cast as an anonymous game. We seek the subgame
perfect equilibrium of this game.
3 Equilibrium Analysis: The Composition of International Com-
merce
In this section, we turn to the equilibrium analysis of our model and determine the equilibrium
pattern of export, greenﬁeld FDI, and international mergers. We derive ﬁrms’ payoﬀsa sa
function of their capabilities and their mode of foreign market access. We then turn to the
equilibrium analysis in each of the two industries. First, we will consider industry M,w h e r e
ﬁrms diﬀer in their mobile capabilities. Then, we will analyze industry N,w h e r eﬁrms diﬀer
in their non-mobile capabilities.
Solving the representative consumer’s utility maximization problem, we obtain the following
















the aggregate price index for good i in country k.
Let b ck
i (ω) denote the marginal cost of selling variety ω in country k, inclusive of the (iceberg-
type) transportation cost (if any). Recall that ﬁrms can price-discriminate between countries.
Proﬁt maximization then implies that each ﬁrm charges a ﬁx e dm a r k u p ,a n ds opk(ω)=
b ck








where the markup-adjusted residual demand level Sk
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It is straightforward to show that the cross-country diﬀerences in the market prices of
capabilities are arbitrarily small, given that the two countries are of suﬃciently similar size.
It then follows that a ﬁrm will never produce abroad without also producing at home. To see
this, note that the ﬁrm could just switch production (including the ownership of the non-mobile
capabilities) from one country to the other, and increase its proﬁtb ys a v i n go nt h eﬁxed costs
(Fc,i or Ff,i), whereas all other components of proﬁts will only change by an arbitrarily small
amount. A ﬁrm will always serve its home market by locating production at home, and so
ﬁrms will only diﬀer in their way of serving the foreign market. Further, a ﬁrm will never
have a marketing team abroad without also having one at home: otherwise, it could sell the
foreign marketing team, buy a domestic marketing team, and save the coordination cost Fc,i.
Hence, we are left with three modes of foreign market access: (i) production at home, using a
home marketing marketing team (export); (ii) production at home and abroad, using a home
marketing team (greenﬁeld FDI), and (iii) production at home and abroad, using a marketing
team in each country (cross-border merger).
For each of the three modes of foreign market access, the gross proﬁto faﬁrm with capa-
bilities {n1
i,n 2
i,m i} that is generated in country k is given by
Sk
i Tiδnl
imi for export from country l 6= k to country k
Sk
i δnl
imi for greenﬁeld FDI from country l 6= k
Sk
i nk
i mi for local production and local marketing,
where Ti = τ
1−σi
i < 1.
Our assumptions ensure that we can analyze industries M and N separately. For notational
convenience, we henceforth drop the industry subscript i.
3.1 Industry M: Heterogeneity in Mobile Capabilities
We ﬁrst consider industry M, where mobile capability m is heterogeneous across ﬁrms and the
distribution of ﬁrms’ non-mobile capabilities nk is degenerate. Speciﬁcally, for an entrant in
country k, m is drawn from the continuous and strictly increasing distribution function H(·)Nocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 13
with density h(·) and support [0,∞),w h i l enk =1with probability µ (independently of the
realization of m), and nk =0otherwise.
Since the non-mobile capability nk =0cannot be used for generating proﬁts, its market
v a l u em u s tb ez e r o ,i . e . ,V k(0) = 0. In equilibrium, ﬁrms with diﬀerent mobile capabilities
m will take diﬀerent actions in the merger market. Since each active ﬁrm needs exactly one
mobile capability m, it is convenient to consider the optimal decisions of a ﬁrm at the merger






m − V k(1), l 6= k,
where V k(1) is the opportunity cost of using (or the actual cost of purchasing) the domestic
non-mobile capability nk =1 . If, instead, she decides to purchase both a domestic nk =1and






m − V k(1) − V l(1) − Ff, l 6= k,
where Ff is the ﬁxed cost of managing the foreign marketing team in country l. Finally, if she






m − V k(1) − Fc, l 6= k,
where Fc is the coordination cost associated with production in country l,u s i n gam a r k e t i n g
team in country k. At the beginning of the merger stage, the value of a ﬁrm with mobile
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there exist (unique) thresholds mk
0, mk
1,a n dmk
2 such that a ﬁrm with capability m in country
k will be inactive if 0 ≤ m<m k
0, engaged in exporting abroad if mk
0 ≤ m<m k
1, engaged in
greenﬁeld FDI if mk
1 ≤ m<m k




      
      
0 if m ∈ [0,m k
0],
wk








m(m) if m ∈ [mk
2,∞).
(3)
We can summarize the equilibrium sorting of ﬁr m sa sf o l l o w s .
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, there exist unique thresholds 0 <m k
0 ≤ mk
1 ≤ mk
2 such that all


















engage in greenﬁeld FDI,
while all remaining ﬁrms with m>m k
2 engage in cross-border M&A.
It is straightforward to see that some ﬁrms (namely those with high m) will always engage
in cross-border mergers. While parameters may be such that no ﬁrm engages in greenﬁeld
investment or exporting, it is straightforward to ﬁnd conditions such that, in equilibrium,
there is a positive mass of ﬁrms engaging in each of the three modes of foreign market access.
For instance, if the ﬁxed cost of entry, Fe,i ss u ﬃciently small (or T suﬃciently large) and
the ﬁxed cost of managing a foreign marketing team, Ff,s u ﬃciently large, then each mode of
foreign market access will be used by some ﬁrms.

















V l(1) + Ff − Fc
Sl(1 − δ)
. (6)
F i r m st h a td e c i d et oe x p o r ta r et h u sl e s se ﬃcient than ﬁrms that engage in FDI (through either
greenﬁeld investment or cross-border mergers). On the one hand, exports require lower ﬁxedNocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 15
costs. On the other, transport costs have to be incurred for each unit shipped abroad, and
so the marginal increase in payoﬀ from raising mobile capability m is lower than with FDI.
Similarly, ﬁrms that engage in greenﬁeld investment suﬀer from the lower perceived quality
relative to ﬁrms that purchased a local non-mobile capability, but save the market price of
such a capability.
Merger Market Equilibrium. We now consider equilibrium in the merger market. Since
each entrant is “born” with one mobile capability m,a n de a c ha c t i v eﬁrm needs only one m,
we may restrict attention to the merger market for non-mobile capabilities.
Let Ek denote the mass of entrants in country k. Since the probability of nk =1for a new
entrant is equal to µ, the supply (through entry) of non-mobile capabilities of type nk =1in
country k is µEk. Each active domestic ﬁrm needs a non-mobile capability of type nk =1 ,a n d




. Moreover, all foreign entrepreneurs who decide
to engage in cross-border M&A also require a domestic non-mobile capability of type nk =1 ,




. The clearing condition for the merger market












Note that foreign buyers of domestic non-mobile capabilities in the merger market tend to be
more eﬃcient (in that they have higher m’s) than domestic buyers: foreign buyers are all ﬁrms
with m ≥ ml
2, while domestic buyers are those domestic ﬁrms with m ≥ mk
0 who received a
nk =0upon entry. We now claim that for the merger market to clear the market price of a
viable non-mobile capability must be positive: V k(1) > 0. To see this, note that the right-hand
side of the merger market clearing condition, (7), is positive. Since µ<1, for the left-hand
side to be positive as well, we must have mk
0 > 0,a n ds o ,f r o m( 4 ) ,V k(1) > 0.
Free Entry. We now turn to ﬁrm behavior at the entry stage. Since each potential entrant
in country k has the option of not entering and earning zero proﬁts, in equilibrium, potential
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Equilibrium. Equilibrium in industry M with 0 <m k
0 <m k
1 <m k
2 can formally be deﬁned as








satisfying equations (4) to (10).
3.2 Industry N: Heterogeneity in Immobile Capabilities
We now turn to industry N, where non-mobile capabilities (nk) are heterogeneous across ﬁrms
and the distribution of ﬁrms’ mobile capabilities (m) is degenerate. Speciﬁcally, for an entrant
in country k, nk is drawn from the continuous distribution function G(·) with density g(·) and
support [0,∞),w h i l em =1with probability ν (independently of the realization of nk), and
m =0otherwise.
Since a mobile capability with m =0cannot be used for production, its market value must
be zero, i.e., Wk(0) = 0.C o n s i d e rn o waﬁrm which already owns a mobile capability of type
m =1in country k.T h eﬁrm may decide to export, the maximum payoﬀ of which is
wk









x denote the set of non-mobile capabilities that will be used, in equilibrium, for exports.
The ﬁrm must be indiﬀerent between each of these non-mobile capabilities, and so
dV k(n)
dn
= Sk + SlTδ for all n ∈ ∆k
x.Nocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 17
Alternatively, the ﬁrm may decide to engage in greenﬁeld investment abroad. The maximum
payoﬀ of this mode of foreign market access is
wk













= Sk + Slδ for all n ∈ ∆k
g,
to ensure that the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between all the non-mobile capabilities in ∆k
g. Finally, the
ﬁrm may decide to engage in cross-border M&A, the maximum payoﬀ of which is given by
wk
m =m a x
n
n





Sln − V l(n)
o
− Ff.
Note that this payoﬀ is independent of the ﬁrm’s home country, i.e., wk
m = wl
m.D e n o t i n gb y
∆k
m the set of non-mobile capabilities that will be used for cross-border mergers, we must have
dV k(n)
dn






















Assuming Wk(1) > 0 (which holds in equilibrium), we must have V k(n)=0for n suﬃciently
small. That is, the least eﬃcient non-mobile capabilities will not be used in equilibrium.
























x are employed for exports to country






g are used for greenﬁeld investment. Hence, in contrast to
industry M,t h eﬁrms engaging in cross-border mergers are the least eﬃcient active ﬁrms. If one
capability is of varying quality, then ﬁrms would optimally like to spread the best capabilities
over as many units as possible. Cross-border mergers allow mobile capabilities to be used in
both countries, whereas country-speciﬁc non-mobile capabilities will only be employed in one
country. Hence, if there is heterogeneity in the non-mobile capabilities (and homogeneity inNocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 18
the mobile capabilities), then cross-border mergers will involve worse capabilities than exports
and greenﬁeld investment. In industry M, the reverse is true. What remains true is that ﬁrms
engaging in greenﬁeld investment are more eﬃcient than those who decide to export. The
equilibrium sorting of ﬁrms can be summarized as follows.






















are used for exports, while all remaining non-mobile capabilities nk >n k
2 are used for
greenﬁeld FDI.
It is straightforward to ﬁnd conditions such that, in equilibrium, each mode of foreign
market access is used by some ﬁrms. This holds, for instance, if the coordination cost Fc is
suﬃciently large (or transport costs are suﬃciently small so that T is suﬃciently close to 1)
and the ﬁxed cost of managing a foreign marketing team, Ff,s u ﬃciently small.









Since non-mobile capabilities can be traded, conditional on owning a mobile capability of type






Moreover, since the payoﬀ from cross-border mergers is independent of the ﬁrm’s home country,
wk
m = wl
m, the value of the mobile capability must be the same in both countries:
Wk(1) = Wl(1) ≡ W(1).
Note that viable mobile capabilities (m =1 ) are scarce since with positive probability a new
entrant obtains a non-viable mobile capability (m =0 ), whereas all non-mobile capabilities are
viable (nk > 0). Hence, W(1) > 0.Nocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 19
The market price for non-mobile capabilities, V k(n), can then be written as follows:
V k(n)=

         
         





















































i are thus given by
nk
0 =














Merger Market Equilibrium. We are now in the position to consider equilibrium in the
merger market. Any cross-border merger involves exactly one non-mobile capability from




















Moreover, the market for mobile capabilities must clear as well. The world supply of mobile
capabilities of type m =1is ν
¡
Ek + El¢
. On the demand side, the number of ﬁrms in country




. In addition, in the two











in cross-border mergers. Hence, in equilibrium,4
Ek
h





1 − ν − G(nl
1)
i
, l 6= k. (16)
When the two countries are identical, foreign buyers purchase less eﬃcient domestic non-mobile
capabilities in the merger market than domestic buyers: foreign buyers purchase nk ∈ [nk
0,n k
1),







. However, since the two
countries are assumed to be of suﬃciently similar size, this condition is satisﬁed if (16) holds.Nocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 20
while domestic buyers (who are those ﬁrms who received a nk <n k
0 upon entry) purchase
nk ∈ [nk
0,∞).
Free Entry. In equilibrium, the value of a new entrant must be equal to zero. This free






































ndG(n)=Φ(ni)+ni [1 − G(ni)].
Equilibrium. Equilibrium in industry N with 0 <n k
0 <n k
1 <n k
2 can formally be deﬁned as








satisfying equations (11) to (20).
3.3 Discussion
In both industries M and N,d i ﬀerent ﬁrms will choose a diﬀerent mode of foreign market
access. However, the theory’s predictions on the relationship between a ﬁrm’s eﬃciency (as
measured by the ratio between perceived quality and marginal cost) and its equilibrium mode
of foreign market access are very diﬀerent for the two industries. In industry M,t h em o s t
eﬃcient ﬁrms engage in cross-border M&A, less eﬃcient ﬁrms engage in greenﬁeld FDI, while
the least eﬃcient active ﬁrms export to the foreign country. In contrast, in industry N,i ti sNocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 21
the least eﬃcient active ﬁrms that engage in cross-border M&A, more eﬃcient ﬁrms engage in
exporting, and the most eﬃcient ﬁrms in greenﬁeld FDI. Below, we discuss the economics of
the assignment of capabilities, and provide an intuition for the diﬀerences in the predictions
for the two industries.
To understand the role of mergers in our model, consider a social planner whose objective
it is to assemble ﬁrms from the existing (post-entry) supplies of mobile and non-mobile capa-
bilities in each country so as to maximize aggregate industry proﬁts (taking as given ﬁrms’
pricing decisions). Indeed, given our assumption of a perfectly competitive merger market, the
equilibrium assignment of capabilities is equivalent to the solution to the planner’s problem.
In assigning non-mobile to mobile capabilities, the resource constraint facing the social
planner in the two industries is similar in two important respects. First, the social planner can
assemble two kinds of ﬁrms: (i) ﬁrms that use one viable mobile and non-mobile capability
(exporters or greenﬁeld FDI), and (ii) ﬁrms that use one viable mobile capability in conjunction
with one viable non-mobile capability from each country (cross-border M&A). By doing the
latter, the planner allows the ﬁrm to avoid transport costs and to use non-mobile capabilities
that are specialized for each country. Second, in both industries, there is homogeneity in one
type of capability and heterogeneity in the other.
Given the nature of random draws of capabilities at the entry stage, the homogeneous
capability is scarce in the sense that the mass of viable homogeneous capabilities is less than
the mass of viable heterogeneous capabilities. Hence, the optimal assignment of capabilities in
each industry is such that all heterogeneous capabilities below a certain threshold value remain
inactive. This threshold capability is directly aﬀected by the mass of capabilities used for cross-
border mergers. Cross-border M&A has thus an important impact on the distribution of ﬁrm
eﬃciencies within an industry, which we explore in more detail in the section on comparative
statics.
While the mass of viable heterogeneous capabilities exceeds the mass of viable homogeneous
capabilities, “low quality” heterogeneous capabilities are imperfect substitutes for “high qual-
ity” heterogeneous capabilities. In that sense, the best heterogeneous capabilities are scarce
a n ds h o u l dt h u sb eu s e di nt h em o s te ﬀective manner. The existence of trade frictions in ourNocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 22
model — transport costs and imperfect mobility of marketing — reduces the eﬀective size of
markets. This gives rise to a “superstar phenomenon” (Rosen, 1981): the best heterogeneous
capabilities should be assigned to serve the largest markets.
The planner faces a diﬀerent problem in the two industries as the source of ﬁrm heterogene-
i t yi sv e r yd i ﬀerent. Consider ﬁrst industry M, where the mobile capability m is heterogeneous,
and in each country the supply of these capabilities exceeds the supply of the viable homo-
geneous capability nk =1 . The existence of trade frictions implies that mobile capabilities
used for cross-border mergers serve a larger eﬀective market than those used for either exports
or greenﬁeld FDI. Since the best mobile capabilities are the “superstars” in this industry, the
social planner optimally assigns the best mobile capabilities to cross-border mergers. Arrang-
ing cross-border mergers comes at a cost, however: since each mobile capability is assigned to
two scarce non-mobile capabilities (one from each country), it is necessary to increase m0,t h e
threshold value of mbelow which all mobile capabilities are inactive. That is, increasing the
number of cross-border mergers comes at the expense of the number of varieties oﬀered.
The trade-oﬀs facing the social planner are very diﬀerent in industry N, where it is the
non-mobile capability nk that is heterogeneous, and in each country the supply of all nk > 0
is greater than the supply of the viable mobile capability m =1 . Non-mobile capabilities used
f o rc r o s s - b o r d e rm e r g e r ss e r v eas m a l l e re ﬀective market (one country rather than two) than
those used for either exports or greenﬁeld FDI. Since the best non-mobile capabilities are the
“superstars” in this industry, the social planner optimally assigns the worst active non-mobile
capabilities to cross-border mergers. As before, the beneﬁt of a cross-border merger is to avoid
trade frictions. Since each cross-border involves two non-mobile capabilities (one from each
country) sharing a single mobile capability, an increase in the number of cross-border mergers
leads to a lower threshold value nk
0, below which non-mobile capabilities are inactive.
Ak e yd i ﬀerence between the two industries is therefore that an increase in the volume of
cross-border mergers has the opposite eﬀect on the eﬃciency of the marginal active ﬁrm: in
industry M, it leads to an increase in the quality of the marginal capability used, while in
industry N, it leads to a decrease. As we will show later, this will play out in very diﬀerent
predictions on the eﬀects of country and industry characteristics on the distribution of ﬁrmNocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 23
eﬃciencies. The source of ﬁrm heterogeneity matters.5
If cross-border mergers were not feasible, the source of ﬁrm heterogeneity would not mat-
ter: the composition of international commerce would qualitatively be the same in the two
industries. Both exporting and greenﬁeld FDI involve mobile and non-mobile capabilities in
only one location, but the latter involves no transport costs and hence a larger eﬀective market
size. Consequently, in both industries, the more eﬃcient ﬁrms should engage in greenﬁeld FDI
rather than in exporting.
4 Comparative Statics
In this section, we analyze the eﬀects of country and industry characteristics on the composition
of international commerce, and on the distribution of ﬁrm eﬃciencies. We show that the source
of ﬁrm heterogeneity has wide-ranging implications for the eﬀects of country and industry
characteristics on the eﬃciency of the marginal ﬁrm.
4.1 Country Size
What is the eﬀect of country size on the equilibrium pattern of exports, greenﬁeld FDI, and
cross-border M&A? We address this question by ﬁrst assuming that countries are initially
identical, i.e., Y 1 = Y 2, and then considering a small change in country sizes that maintains
global income so that dY k = −dY l > 0. The following lemma simpliﬁes our discussion. (All
proofs are relegated to the appendix.)
5By restricting attention to one-sided heterogeneity in each industry, we are able to identify the source of
ﬁrm heterogeneity as an important industry characteristic for both the composition of international commerce as
well as the distribution of ﬁrm eﬃciencies. If we were to assume two-sided heterogeneity in both the mobile and
non-mobile capabilities, a complex interaction between countervailing eﬀects would arise. From our discussion
of the superstar phenomenon, cross-border mergers should involve the best mobile capabilities and the worst
non-mobile capabilities. However, complementarities between mobile and non-mobile capabilities (as assumed in
our model) should imply positive assortative matching, i.e., the best non-mobile capabilities should be employed
with the best mobile capabilities. But if the best mobile and non-mobile capabilities were involved in cross-
border M&A, the best non-mobile capabilities would wastefully serve only one market. General analytical results
for the case of two-sided heterogeneity are unavailable.Nocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 24
Lemma 1 Suppose the two countries are initially of the same size, i.e., Y 1 = Y 2, and consider
a small change in country sizes such that dY k = −dY l. Then, the change in any endogenous
variable u has the same absolute value in the two countries, but is of opposite sign: duk = −dul.
We ﬁrst turn to the eﬀects of changes in country size in industry M.
Proposition 3 Consider industry M. Suppose the two countries are initially of the same size,
i.e., Y 1 = Y 2, and consider a small increase in the size of country k (and a small decrease in
t h es i z eo fc o u n t r yl 6= k) such that dY k = −dY l > 0.T h e n ,













2 are the (new) thresholds in the larger market. Furthermore,
dmk
0 = −dml
0 < 0,d m k
1 = −dml
1 > 0,d m k
2 = −dml
2 > 0.
We now want to discuss the intuition for these results. Appealing to lemma 1, we focus
on the larger country k. The direct eﬀect of a redistribution of global income is to raise the
markup-adjusted residual demand curve in country k. This raises the number of entrants, Ek.












On the l.h.s. is the “net supply” (after domestic mergers) of the viable non-mobile capability
nk =1 , while on the r.h.s. is the foreign demand for this capability. At the initial thresholds,
there is now an excess supply of nk =1 . This causes the market value of this capability to drop,
dV k(1) < 0. Thus it is now more attractive for mobile capabilities to be used in the larger
market: demand is higher, dSk > 0, and non-mobile capabilities are cheaper, dV k(1) < 0.
Firms in the smaller country l will therefore integrate to a larger extent into country k,a n ds o
dml
1 < 0 and dml
2 < 0. For the same reason, the value of those mobile capabilities in countryNocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 25
k that are used for exporting or greenﬁeld FDI is now larger, dWk(m) > 0 for m ∈ (mk
0,m k
2).
Consequently, less eﬃcient mobile capabilities will still be used in equilibrium, dmk
0 < 0.S i n c e
global market size remains unchanged, the value of those mobile capabilities that continue to
be used for cross-border M&A does not change.
We now turn to the eﬀects of changes in country size in industry N.
Proposition 4 Consider industry N. Suppose the two countries are initially of the same size,
i.e., Y 1 = Y 2, and consider a small increase in the size of country k (and a small decrease in
t h es i z eo fc o u n t r yl 6= k) such that dY k = −dY l > 0.T h e n ,
dSk = −dSl > 0,d E k = −dEl > 0,d W (1) = 0,







> 0 if n>b n





i) refers to a new threshold in market k (l). Furthermore,
dnk
0 = −dnl
0 > 0,d n k
1 = −dnl
1 < 0,d n k
2 = −dnl
2 > 0.
The direct eﬀect of the redistribution of global income from country l to country k is to
raise the markup-adjusted residual demand level Sk in country k, a n dt or e d u c ei ti nc o u n t r yl.
This direct eﬀect has several immediate implications. First, it follows from equation (14) that
dnk
2 > 0:i nc o u n t r yk, ﬁrms switch from greenﬁeld FDI to exporting since the incentive to
avoid transport cost is weaker in a smaller market. Second, the value of non-mobile capabilities
in each country is altered: as can be seen from equation (11), the increase in Sk directly raises
the value of all non-mobile capabilities V k(n) in country k. In contrast, the shadow value of
viable mobile capabilities is unaﬀected by the redistribution of global income since the value
of these capabilities must be the same in both countries. The increase in the value of non-
mobile capabilities in country k induces a larger number of entrants, Ek. The greater supply of
non-mobile capabilities depresses their value, and reduces each ﬁrm’s residual demand. Does
the increased number of entrants reduce the markup-adjusted demand level Sk and the priceNocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 26
schedule V k(n) to its initial values? The answer is no. If they were to return to their initial
levels, the thresholds nk
i would be the same as before, but the number of ﬁr m si ne a c hc o u n t r y













as Ek >E land nk
i = nl
i. Intuitively, there is an excess supply of small nk’s, and so their market
price must fall. Hence, dnk
0 > 0. However, in expectation, the value of an entrant’s draw
of nk must remain unchanged, as can be seen from the free entry condition. It follows that
the market value of large nk’s must rise. Despite the larger number of entrants, the residual
demand level Sk must be larger, and so the incremental value of a slightly better nk increases:
the price schedule V k(n) becomes steeper.
General Discussion of Country Eﬀects. There are two important lessons that come out
of the above analysis. First, in both industries M and N, market size “matters”: changes in
country size aﬀect the composition of international commerce and the eﬃciency of the marginal
active ﬁrm. This is due to the existence of the merger market. In the absence of the merger
market, free entry would imply — as in Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) — that the markup-
adjusted residual demand level were the same in both countries, Sk = Sl. Independently of any
size diﬀerence, the thresholds would be the same as well. As explained above, in our model, the
markup-adjusted demand levels cannot be the same in countries of diﬀerent size since otherwise
the cross-border merger market would not clear: there would be an excess supply (demand) of
(for) non-mobile capabilities in the larger (smaller) country.6
Second, the eﬀect of market size on the distribution of ﬁrm eﬃciencies is very diﬀerent for
diﬀerent industries as it depends critically on the source of ﬁrm heterogeneity. In industry M,
weaker ﬁrms are able to survive in the larger market, while the opposite is true for industry
6While the merger market is necessary for market size to matter, there is a subtle diﬀerence between industries
M and N. For market size to matter in industry M requires an additional ingredient: the ﬁxed cost Ff of
managing a foreign marketing team (or some other small friction for cross-border mergers). In contrast, market
size would matter for industry N even in the absence of such a ﬁxed cost.Nocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 27
N.7
While there is dichotomy between industries M and N regarding the eﬀe c to fm a r k e ts i z e
on the distribution of ﬁrm eﬃciencies, a common prediction for both industries is that the
fraction of entrants who engage in FDI (through either greenﬁeld or cross-border mergers) is
smaller in the larger country. This is consistent with the empirical evidence.8
4.2 Industry Characteristics
Our analysis so far has highlighted the importance of a particular industry characteristic,
t h es o u r c eo fﬁrm heterogeneity, for the composition of international commerce. We now
investigate how the sorting of ﬁrms into diﬀerent modes of foreign market access changes with
other industry characteristics, namely transport costs and the ﬁxed cost of cross-border M&A.
As our analysis will show, the eﬀects of these industry characteristics will be very diﬀerent in
industries M and N. For simplicity, we assume that the two countries are identical, Y 1 = Y 2.
For notational convenience, we henceforth drop country indices.
Mobility of Capabilities. We seek to analyze the eﬀects of a change in δ, the degree of
mobility of capability n.
Proposition 5 Consider an increase in δ, the degree of mobility of capability n.( a )T h e n ,i n
industry M,
dS < 0, dm0 < 0, dm1 < 0, dm2 > 0.
(b) Then, in industry N,
dS < 0, dn0 > 0, dn1 < 0, dn2 < 0.
For ﬁrms engaging in exporting the level of (foreign) market size is proportional to SδT,
for ﬁrms engaging in greenﬁeld FDI it is proportional to Sδ,w h i l ef o rﬁrms engaging in cross-
border M&A it is proportional to S. In both industries, holding ﬁxed the number of entrants
7The closed-economy models of Asplund and Nocke (2003) and Nocke (2003) predict that ﬁr m sh a v et ob e
more eﬃcient to survive in larger markets, which is in line with the predictions for industry N. However, their
result is due to an endogenous increase in the intensity of price competition in larger markets.
8See, for instance, Yeaple (2003) and Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2002).Nocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 28
and the thresholds, the direct eﬀect of an increase in δ is to reduce the markup-adjusted residual
demand level S. However, the induced fractional increase in S is smaller than the (exogenous)
fractional increase in δ,a n ds oSδ increases. Consequently, the payoﬀ from cross-border mergers
tends to fall, while the payoﬀ from exporting and greenﬁeld FDI tends to rise. However, since
ﬁrms engaging in greenﬁeld FDI do not have to incur transport costs, the fractional increase in
the payoﬀ from greenﬁeld FDI is greater than that from exporting. The eﬀect of the increase
in δ on the thresholds follows immediately from these observations. However, the relative size
of the movements in the thresholds is determined by the merger market clearing conditions.
In both industries, the primary eﬀect of an increase in the mobility of the less mobile
capability n is to change the composition of foreign direct investment. As the mobility of
n increases, the ratio between ﬁrms engaging in cross-border M&A and those engaging in
greenﬁeld FDI decreases. In the limit as δ → 1, cross-border mergers disappear, while in the
limit as δ → 0,g r e e n ﬁeld FDI disappears. Hence, for cross-border M&A to occur, there must
be some ﬁrm capabilities that are imperfectly mobile internationally.
Transport Costs. We now turn to the eﬀects of a change in transport costs (or tariﬀs)
on the composition of international commerce.
Proposition 6 Consider a decrease in transport costs, i.e., an increase in T.( a ) T h e n , i n
industry M,
dS < 0, dm0 < 0, dm1 > 0, dm2 > 0.
(b) Then, in industry N,
dS < 0, dn0 > 0, dn1 < 0, dn2 > 0.
As pointed out above, for ﬁrms engaging in exporting the level of (foreign) market size is
proportional to SδT,f o rﬁrms engaging in greenﬁeld FDI it is proportional to Sδ,w h i l ef o r
ﬁrms engaging in cross-border M&A it is proportional to S. In both industries, holding ﬁxed
the number of entrants and the thresholds, the direct eﬀect of an increase in T is to reduce
the markup-adjusted residual demand level S. However, the induced fractional increase in S
is smaller than the (exogenous) fractional increase in T,a n ds oST increases. Consequently,Nocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 29
the payoﬀ from cross-border mergers and greenﬁeld FDI tends to fall, while the payoﬀ from
exporting tends to rise. However, since ﬁrms engaging in cross-border mergers face a larger
foreign demand than ﬁrms engaging in greenﬁeld FDI, the fractional decrease in the payoﬀ
from cross-border M&A is greater than that from greenﬁeld FDI. The eﬀect of the increase in
T on the thresholds follows immediately from these observations. However, the relative size of
the movements in the thresholds is determined by the merger market clearing conditions.
In both industries, the primary eﬀect of a decrease in transport costs, i.e., an increase in
T, is to change the fraction of ﬁrms engaging in foreign direct investment. As T increases, the
fraction of entrants engaging in either cross-border M&A or greenﬁeld FDI decreases. However,
as long as δ is suﬃciently small, cross-border mergers occur even in the limit as T → 1,w h i l e
greenﬁeld FDI disappears in the limit. This may explain why most FDI between the US
and Europe, where trade barriers are small, is in the form of cross-border M&A rather than
greenﬁeld FDI. In contrast, a much larger fraction of FDI between the North and the South,
where trade barriers are large, is in the form of greenﬁeld FDI.
General Discussion of Industry Eﬀects. The eﬀect of changes in δ and T has very diﬀerent
implications for the distribution of ﬁrm eﬃciencies in the two industries. In industry M,
an increase in either δ or T reduces the eﬃciency (m0) of the marginal active ﬁrm, while
in industry N,t h ee ﬀect on n0 is the opposite. The reason for this dichotomy is that the
composition of international commerce is very diﬀerent in the two industries. In industry M,
the marginal active ﬁrm is an exporter, while in industry N,i ti saﬁrm engaging in cross-border
M&A. Since an increase in δ or T makes exporting relatively more attractive and cross-border
mergers relative less attractive, m0 has to fall in industry M,w h i l en0 rises in industry N.
These results have important implications for the growing empirical literature on the eﬀects
of trade policies on aggregate productivity. Crucially, our theory shows that the empirical
relationship between trade costs and aggregate industry eﬃciency cannot be predicted without
prior knowledge of the source of ﬁrm heterogeneity in that industry.Nocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 30
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have developed a theory of international commerce in which ﬁrms can choose
between three diﬀerent modes of foreign market access: exporting, greenﬁeld FDI, and cross-
border mergers and acquisitions. Our framework is based on three key ideas. First, there
is heterogeneity in ﬁrms’ capabilities. Second, these capabilities diﬀer in their degree of in-
ternational mobility. Third, capabilities are traded in a merger market, and so their price is
determined by endogenous supply and demand. We have applied this framework to address
two questions: (1) what are the characteristics of ﬁrms that choose the diﬀerent modes of for-
eign market access, and (2) what are the eﬀects of country and industry characteristics on the
composition of international commerce and the distribution of ﬁrm eﬃciencies? The answers
to these questions are of importance to a growing empirical literature on ﬁrm heterogeneity
and the composition of international commerce.
A main result of our analysis is that the source of ﬁrm heterogeneity is a critical industry
characteristic for the composition of international commerce. Depending on whether ﬁrms
diﬀer in their mobile or non-mobile capabilities, cross-border M&A involves either the most or
the least eﬃcient active ﬁrms. The source of ﬁrm heterogeneity also plays an important role
for the eﬀects of country and industry characteristics on the distribution of ﬁrm eﬃciencies.
Our analysis has also highlighted the importance of the merger market clearing condition
for the predictions of our model. Since the changes in country and industry characteristics
directly impact upon the supply and demand of capabilities, the eﬀect of these characteristics
on aggregate industry eﬃciency is mediated by the merger market.
While the three key ideas mentioned above are critical for our results, the particular as-
signment of diﬀerent types of capabilities to diﬀerent “activities” is not. In this paper, we have
considered two types of activities, production and marketing, each of which requires a diﬀerent
type of capability. More generally, what matters in our framework is that diﬀerent activities
require capabilities that vary in their degree of international mobility, and that these activities
are complementary in generating proﬁts.
Our theory may also be used as a framework to inform government policies toward interna-Nocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 31
tional commerce. Because cross-border M&A involves the acquisition of a local ﬁrm by a foreign
multinational enterprise, cross-border M&A brings “less” to the host country’s economy than
greenﬁeld FDI. Moreover, as our analysis has shown, ﬁrms with diﬀerent capabilities choose
diﬀerent modes of foreign market access. Hence, the optimal government policy toward foreign
direct investment should be tailored to the particular type of FDI: greenﬁeld vs. cross-border
M&A. A rigorous analysis of the policy implications of our theory, however, raises a number
of modeling issues (government objectives, set of policy instruments) that we plan to address
in a separate paper.
Appendix: Proofs
P r o o fo fl e m m a1 . The endogenous variable u in country k may be written as a function of
the country sizes, f(Y k,Yl),w h e r et h eﬁrst argument refers to the own country size, and the
second argument to the size of the other country. Assuming diﬀerentiability of f (which can
be veriﬁed to hold for our problem at hand), the endogenous change in the value of uk is given
by
duk = f1(Y k,Yl)dY k + f2(Y k,Yl)dY l,
where fi is the derivative of f with respect to its ith argument. Similarly, the endogenous
change in the value of ul is equal to
dul = f1(Y l,Yk)dY l + f2(Y l,Yk)dY k.
Since Y k = Y l,w eh a v efi(Y k,Yl)=fi(Y l,Yk). Moreover, by assumption, dY k = −dY l,a n d
so dul can be rewritten as
dul = −f1(Y k,Yl)dY k − f2(Y k,Yl)dY l
= −duk.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3 . Since the two countries are (initially) of the same size, the merger
market clearing condition (7) implies that
µ =2− H(mk
0) − H(mk
2). (21)Nocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 32
Taking the logarithm of the merger market clearing condition, then forming the total derivative,



















dV k(1) + ΓdSk =0 , (23)
where
Γ ≡ (1 − Tδ)Ψ(mk
0) − (1 − T)δΨ(mk
1) − (1 − δ)Ψ(mk
2)
Observe that changes in the thresholds mk
i cancel out (i.e., dmk
i =0 ). This is due to the
envelope theorem and the fact that the thresholds are eﬃcient from the ﬁrms’ point of view in




follows that V k(1) and dSk move in opposite directions, i.e., dV k(1)dSk < 0 whenever dSk 6=0 .






























V k(1) + Ff − Fc
. (24)
We thus obtain that mk
1 and mk
2 move in the same direction as demand level Sk,w h i l emk
0
moves in the opposite direction. That is, dmk
1dSk > 0, dmk
2dSk > 0,a n ddmk
0dSk < 0,p r o v i d e d
dSk 6=0 . From equation (22), it then follows that the mass of entrants Ek and demand level
Sk move in the same direction, i.e., dEkdSk > 0.








0 − (1 − T)δΨ0(mk
1)dmk





















Since Ψ0(mi) < 0, the term in curly brackets has the same sign as dEk and dSk. Hence, we must
have dSk > 0 because dY k > 0 by assumption. The assertion on Wk(m) follows immediately
from equation (3), dSk = −dSl > 0,a n ddV k(1) = −dV l(1) < 0.Nocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 33
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n4 . Taking the total derivative of the equation for nk
0, (12) or,
equivalently, (18), and applying lemma 1, we obtain dW(1) = 0. Next, taking the total









Hence, the threshold nk
2 moves in the same direction as demand level Sk, i.e., dnk
2dSk > 0,
provided dSk 6=0 . Similarly, from the equation for nk
















Consider now the free entry condition, equation (17). Taking the total derivative, and using





































Note that the term in curly brackets on the left-hand side of (28) is positive. It is then immediate
that the threshold nk
0 m o v e si nt h es a m ed i r e c t i o na sd e m a n dl e v e lSk, i.e., dnk
0dSk > 0,
assuming dSk 6=0 . From (26), it follows that nk
1 has to move in the opposite direction, i.e.,
dnk














0 moves in the same direction as Sk, while nk
1 moves in the opposition direction, it
follows that the mass of entrants, Ek, moves in the same direction as Sk, i.e., dEkdSk > 0.
It remains to show that demand level Sk moves in the same direction as income (or country














1 + SkEk(1 − T)δnk
2g(nk
2)dnk
2, (30)Nocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 34






















































































































Since the curly brackets on the r.h.s. are positive, and dnk
0dSk > 0, it follows that demand
level Sk and income Y k move in the same direction, i.e., dSk > 0 since dY k > 0 by assumption.
Lemma 2 Suppose the two countries are of the same size, i.e., Y 1 = Y 2. Then, in industry
M, any change in exogenous variables (except µ) causes the thresholds mk
0 and mk
2 to move in
opposite directions. That is, dmk
0dmk
2 < 0,p r o v i d e ddmk
0 6=0or dmk
2 6=0 .











which establishes the result.
Lemma 3 Suppose the two countries are of the same size, i.e., Y 1 = Y 2. Then, in industry
N, any change in exogenous variables (except ν) causes the thresholds nk
0 and nk
1 to move in
opposite directions. That is, dnk
0dnk
1 < 0,p r o v i d e ddnk
0 6=0or dnk
1 6=0 .Nocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 35
Proof. Since the two countries are identical, the market clearing condition for mobile capabil-




The assertion follows immediately.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n5 . (a) We begin by totally diﬀerentiating the threshold condition for














T {Ψ(m0) − Ψ(m1)} + {Ψ(m1) − Ψ(m2)}
(1 + Tδ)Ψ(m0)+( 1− T)δΨ(m1)+( 1− δ)Ψ(m2)
dδ. (32)
From the last equation, we obtain that dSdδ < 0. Since the absolute value of the coeﬃcient in
front of dδ is less than one, it then follows from equation (31) that dm1dδ < 0. Combining the
remaining two threshold conditions, (4) and (6), and totally diﬀerentiating, yields
S(1 − δ)m2 = S(1 + Tδ)m0 + Ff − Fc
Totally diﬀerentiating this expression and rearranging yields
(1 − δ)dm2 =( 1+Tδ)dm0 − (m2 − m0)
dS
S









By substituting expression (32) into the last term in brackets, it can be established that this
bracketed term must be positive. Since dSdδ < 0, it follows that the second term is of the
same sign as dδ.S i n c em2 and m0 must move in opposite directions for the merger market to
clear (see equation (7)), it follows that dm2dδ > 0 and dm0dδ < 0.
(b) Imposing symmetry, and totally diﬀerentiating the three threshold conditions, (12),
(13), and (14), yields
dW(1) = 2[Sdn0 + n0dS], (33)
dn0 − Tδdn1 = Tn1dδ −
dS
S
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[2 − G(n0) − G(n1)]. (36)








−S {[1 − G(n0)]dn0 + Tδ[1 − G(n1)]dn1 +( 1− T)δ [1 − G(n2)]dn2}
= −S {TΦ(n1)+( 1− T)Φ(n2)}dδ.











Hence, dSkdδ < 0. Since the absolute value of the constant in front of dδ is less than one, it
follows from equation (35) that dn2dδ < 0.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c en0 and n1 have to move in opposite
directions for the merger market to clear (lemma 3), and since n0 >Tδ n 1 (as can be seen from
(13)), we establish that dn0dδ > 0 and dn1dδ < 0.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n6 . (a) Imposing symmetry and taking the total derivative of the free




δ (Ψ(m0) − Ψ(m1))
(1 + Tδ)Ψ(m0)+( 1− T)δΨ(m1)+( 1− δ)Ψ(m2)
dT. (37)
As in the proof of proposition 3, changes in the thresholds mi cancel out (due to the envelope
theorem). Here, however, changes in the market price of working plants, V (1), cancel out
as well (if one takes the merger market clearing condition (7) into account) because the two
countries are identical. Since the term in front of dT in equation (37) is negative, S and T
move in opposite directions, and hence dS < 0.










Both terms on the r.h.s. of the equation are positive, and so dm1 > 0.T o t a l l yd i ﬀerentiating
the threshold conditions for m0 and m2, equations (4) and (6), yields
(1 + Tδ)Sdm0 +( 1+Tδ)m0dS + δSm0dT = dV (1),Nocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 37
and
(1 − δ)Sdm2 +( 1− δ)m2dS = dV (1).
Substituting out dV (1), and rearranging, we obtain














Since dS < 0, the second term on the r.h.s. of (38) is positive. Further, from (37), it follows
that the term in curly brackets is positive as well. Hence, if dm0 > 0,w ew o u l dh a v edm2 > 0.
However, this contradicts lemma 2, which states that m0 and m2 move in opposite directions.
Consequently, we must have dm0 < 0 and dm2 > 0.
(b) Imposing symmetry, and totally diﬀerentiating the condition for threshold n0,e q u a t i o n
(12), we obtain
dW(1) = 2[n0dS + Sdn0]. (39)
Similarly, from the equation for nk






















Totally diﬀerentiating the free entry condition, (17), we get
νdW(1) + dS {Φ(n0)+TδΦ(n1)+( 1− T)δΦ(n2)}
−S {[1 − G(n0)]dn0 + Tδ[1 − G(n1)]dn1 +( 1− T)δ [1 − G(n2)]dn2}
= −Skδ {Φ(n1) − Φ(n2)}dT. (42)
From the merger market clearing condition (16), we can replace ν in (42) by ν =[ 2− G(n0)
−G(n1)]/2. Moreover, using equations (39) to (41), we can rewrite (42) as
dS
S
{Θ(n0)+TδΘ(n1)+( 1− T)δΘ(n2)} = −δ {Θ(n1) − Θ(n2)}dT. (43)
Clearly, the terms in curly brackets are positive. Hence, we have dS < 0, because dT > 0 by
assumption. From (40) and lemma 3, and noting that n0 >T δ n 1 (which follows from (13)),
we obtain that dn0 > 0 and dn1 < 0.S i n c edT > 0 and dS < 0, from equation (41) we obtain
that dn2 > 0.Nocke & Yeaple: Mergers and the Composition of International Commerce 38
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